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Summary 
In this thesis, I study the inflow of remittances into the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). The flow of remittances has increased massively during the recent 
decades and is expected to continue growing as migration increases as a result of 
globalization (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). Many Southeast Asian countries have a long 
tradition of migration, largely due to the labor surpluses in these countries. Correlated to the 
increase in outflow of migration is the inflow of remittances. Many migrants feel an 
obligation to financially assist the family in the place of origin. Carling (2008) found a 
positive association between remittances and the household size at origin and a negative 
association to the household size at place of destination. An interesting aspect of the flow of 
remittances is the usage at the receiving end. Is the money only used for consumption and 
therefore have small impacts on economic growth, or is the money invested in education, live 
stock or fixed capital that can boost economic growth in the receiving country? Hence, the 
main purpose of this thesis is to find the impact of remittances on economic growth. Using 
panel data for the time period 1980-2012, I use both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
and Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Squares (IV 2sls) to estimate the impact, and 
decide to rely on the OLS estimates after ensuring that no endogeneity problems exist. The 
estimations state that remittances have a mixed impact on economic growth. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Remittances are the flow of money from migrants abroad to their families in their country of 
origin (Koser, 2007). The flows of remittances have increased significantly during recent 
decades and are expected to continue increasing into the foreseeable future as more people 
migrates in response to globalization and increasing wage differences (Maimbo and Ratha, 
2005). Contributions to the expansion in global migration include income inequalities 
between origin and destination country, low travel cost and a rise in South-South migration. 
The present magnitude of remittance flow and the expected increases, makes it interesting to 
test whether the remittance flow has an effect on the economy of the receiving country, or 
whether remittances, as a single factor, are a source of income for individual households.  
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a group of countries with different 
economic, cultural and historical backgrounds. The increasing fear of communism and a 
desire to increase national economic growth were the motivating factors behind its creation. 
Because of the large differences between the ASEAN countries, there are also large 
differences in the amount of received remittance. The Philippines has a long tradition of 
migration and of sending money home. This is probably why the Philippines are one of the 
top recipients countries of remittances in the world. While Malaysia with an expending 
market, attracts more labor migrants, and therefore the outflow of remittances are larger than 
the inflow in Malaysia (IFAD, 2014). With almost 13 million migrants living abroad, 
Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most active remittance markets. The largest outflow of 
migrants is from the Philippines with 4 billion emigrants the last decade, and Malaysia has 
the largest inflow with 2 billion immigrants (IFAD, 2014). 
 
This thesis is based on the fact that remittances into the Philippines are such a vast part of the 
economy (Tchantchane et al., 2013), and the database is extended to see the impact of the 
inflow of remittances on the ASEAN economies. Due to the lack of available data this thesis 
will concentrate on seven of the ASEAN countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. When discussing ASEAN this relates to the 
seven chosen countries stated, and there might be differences to Singapore, Myanmar and 
Brunei Darussalam. Despite the large differences these countries remain closely connected. 
This was evident during the Asian Financial Crisis as one of the main sources for the 
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escalation of the crisis was not market spillovers, but direct financial linkage between the 
ASEAN countries. As a result of this, the main research question is to find the impact of 
remittances on economic growth in the Southeast Asian region, focusing on the ASEAN.  
 
The following outlines the structure of this thesis: In the next section I present background 
information about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) including economic 
factors and the Asian Financial Crisis, and I introduce the inflow of remittances into the 
Southeast Asian region, especially into the Philippines. The third section reviews theories 
about migration and remittances, including determinants for remittances and the cost of 
remitting money. In section four, previous literature and empirical studies are presented. The 
data I rely on is presented in the beginning of section five, followed by descriptions about the 
model, and at the end of section five the results are presented. Section six concludes.   
	   3	  
2 Background 
 
The purpose of this section is to give some background information about the ASEAN and 
remittances. First, I will present some background information about ASEAN, the 
establishment and the effect of the Asian Currency Crisis on the association. Second, I will 
present information about remittances in the ASEAN region. Lastly I will present background 
information about remittances into the Philippines. 
 
The countries that receive the highest number of migrants internationally, such as the United 
States, Russia and Canada, are the largest origin countries of the flow of remittances. The top 
recipients of remittances, measured in US dollars, are large countries such as India, Mexico 
and China, while top recipients of remittances per capita are smaller countries such as Tonga, 
Lesotho and Lebanon.1 This chapter will briefly look into the relations between receiving and 
sending countries of remittances and the costs of remitting money.  
 
Figure 2.1: Top 10 remittance receiving and Top 10 remittances-sending countries, 20122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data from the World Bank database 
2 In billions US dollars	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2.1 ASEAN 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 as an 
economic and political association, to promote economic and social development in and 
between the member countries. The motivating factor for the creation of ASEAN was the 
increasing fear of communism and a desire to increase national economic growth. The first 
members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, during the next 
three decades Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia joined the 
association (ASEAN, 2014a). 
 
ASEAN consists of 600 million people (in 2012), where 40,6% of the ASEAN population 
lives in Indonesia, 15,9% in the Philippines, 14,6% in Vietnam and 11% in Thailand 
(ASEAN, 2014b). The association has a total GDP of US$ 2,3 trillion, which is 
approximately 3% of the worlds GDP. Excluding the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 
and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-2009, the real GDP growth of ASEAN has been 
constant around 6% for the last 20 years (Hansakul, 2013). Despite the constant growth rates, 
13% of the population lives below the international poverty line of US$1,25 a day (Hsieh, 
2013).  
 
Table 2.1: Statistics about ASEAN countries3  
 
During the period from 1965 to 1990 the East Asian region had an economic growth larger 
than any other region in the world, due mostly to Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Approximately two-thirds of the observed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 * in current US$ millions and ** per capita current US$. Due to lack of available data this thesis will 
concentrate on the ASEAN countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Lao PDR and 
Vietnam. Data retrieved from the World Bank database. 
 Population 
2012 
GDP 
1980* 
GDP 2012* GNI 
2012** 
GDP growth 
2012 
Income level 
(defined by WB) 
Cambodia 14 864 646 n/a 14 054,4 880 7 % Low 
Indonesia 264 864 191 78 013,2 874 485,9 3420 6 % Lower middle 
Lao PDR 6 645 827 n/a 9 359,2 1260 8 % Lower middle 
Malaysia 29 239 927 24 937,0 304 389,7 9820 6 % Upper middle 
Philippines 96 706 764 32 450,4 250 603,0 2960 4 % Lower middle 
Thailand 66 785 001 33 353,5 366 126,6 5250 0 % Upper middle 
Vietnam 88 772 900 n/a 155 820,0 1560 6 % Lower middle 
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growth in these economies is due to the accumulation of physical and human capital, 
especially related to increased primary education. The remaining growth relates to total factor 
productivity growth (Ray, 1998). As a result of this large economic growth, over the 
extended time period, the region was called the “Asian Miracle”. 
 
The large differences in national GDP between the ASEAN-members separates the 
association from other trade blocs such as the European Union (EU) and the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA). In addition, the poverty rates are significantly higher for ASEAN 
member. The European Union operates as a government working for common interest for all 
member countries. This is a stark contrast to how the ASEAN works. In ASEAN all nations 
work on an equal level to find common guidelines when needed. Hsieh (2013) highlights that 
the economic integration of the ASEAN cannot succeed without reducing the development 
gap between the member states, and “…for all ASEAN states, internal integration prompts 
FDI inflows that create a poverty-decreasing effect through economic growth, employment 
and training”.4 
 
 
2.1.1 The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
The Asian Financial Crisis involved several of the ASEAN countries. It started with a 
devaluation of the Thai Baht in 1997 before reaching Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines 
and further to South Korea, Hong Kong and China (Frontline). In the beginning of the 1990s 
the Southeast Asian countries experienced impressive economic growth rates of between 6% 
and 10% annually (Hill). This “Asian Miracle” came to a sudden end in 1997 when the local 
stock markets and currency markets in one country after another collapsed. During the 
collapse of 1997 many states lost over 70% of their stock market value and their currencies 
depreciated against the US dollar. According to Hill, the leaders of these Asian countries 
were forced to seek massive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s Thailand experienced an increase in the demand for Thai baht 
that created a rise in the value against other currencies. Since the Thai Central Bank required 
the Thai baht to be fixed to the American dollar, they had to offset the increase in the demand 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Hsieh, 2013, p. 3	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for the baht by increasing the supply. By selling baht and buying currencies like dollar or 
yen, the money supply of the baht increased. The money multiplier process led to a massive 
expansion of credit supply because of a rise in loans from abroad. The situation began to look 
like Japan’s “bubble economy” of the 1980s (Krugman, 2008, p.80). On July 2 1997, the 
Thai baht devaluated and was no longer fixed to the US dollar.  
 
Table 2.2: Exchange rate (national currency to US dollar) around the Asian Currency Crisis5 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Cambodia 2681 3436 
(-28,2%) 
3770 
(-9,7%) 
3789 
(-0,5%) 
3899 
(-2,9%) 
Indonesia 2377 4908 
(-106,5%) 
7752 
(-57,9%) 
7156 
(+7,7%) 
9486 
(-32,6%) 
Lao PDR 921 2019 
(-119,2%) 
4217 
(-108,9%) 
7674 
(-82,0%) 
8238 
(-7,3%) 
Malaysia 2,53 3,77 
(-49,0%) 
3,8 
(-0,8%) 
3,8 
(0%) 
3,8 
(0%) 
Philippines 26,29 37,17 
(-41,4%) 
39,07 
(-5,1%) 
40,62 
(-4,0%) 
49,90 
(-22,8%) 
Thailand 25,55 45,29 
(-77,3%) 
36,26 
(+19,9%) 
43,06 
(-18,8%) 
43,86 
(-1,9%) 
Vietnam 11124 12291 
(-10,5%) 
13894 
(-13,0%) 
14030 
(-1,0%) 
14511 
(-3,4%) 
Devaluation against the US dollar in the parenthesis.  
 
	  “Typical	  calculations	  suggested	  that	  the	  baht	  would	  have	  to	  fall	  something	  like	  15	  
percent	  to	  make	  Thai	  industry	  cost-­‐competitive	  again,	  so	  a	  decline	  of	  roughly	  that	  
magnitude	  seemed	  likely.	  But	  instead,	  the	  currency	  went	  into	  free	  fall:	  the	  baht	  price	  of	  a	  
dollar	  soared	  50	  percent	  over	  the	  next	  few	  months,	  and	  would	  have	  risen	  even	  further	  if	  
Thailand	  had	  not	  sharply	  raised	  interest	  rates”.6	  
 
The devaluation triggered an economic collapse in Thailand, which rapidly spread to other 
economies in South Asia. GDP growth rates declined quickly, companies with high foreign-
currency risk declared bankruptcy and the governments in the worst affected countries 
needed to ask for IMF led bailouts (Economist, 2007). The countries worst affected by the 
currency crisis were Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea, and to a lesser extent Hong Kong, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia and the Philippines. Brunei, China, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam were 
less affected, but had noticeable changes in demand and there was an overall loss in 
confidence throughout the region. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Raw data are retrieved from the CEIC database and devaluation is estimated with own calculations. 
6 Krugman (2008, p.88)	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One of the main sources for the escalation of the crisis in Southeast Asia was not market 
spillovers, but direct financial linkage. The majority of the money flows to the region were 
routed through emerging market funds and then out to the different countries. As the news 
about the crisis in Thailand began to spread, these funds shrunk the flows of money to the 
region. Another reason for the reduction in investments was that the region was not seen as 
individual countries, but as one. As the crisis in Thailand was unfolding, the expectation was 
that the same would happen to the rest of the region, this made investors hold back money. 
The loss in confidence to the “Asian Miracle” started a brutal circle of economic and 
financial breakdown (Krugman, 2008). 
 
It did not take long after the crisis before the growth rates were back up to normal levels. 
Lessons were learned from the crisis, and a decade later the economic fundamentals are 
generally strong. Thailand has had a current account surplus since 1997, decreased external 
debt, and the Bank of Thailand has imposed controls on the inflow of capital to control the 
currency. In Indonesia the external debt has dropped, and the exchange rate is no longer 
artificially high. The banking sector has undergone changes to reduce the repayment risk 
associated with currency volatility. A decade after the crisis, the Malaysian economy benefits 
from an increasing external demand for electronics, and a strong domestic consumption. 
Restructuring in the financial sector made the economy prepared for dealing with future 
financial difficulties (Economist, 2007). 
 
 
2.1.2 Remittances in Southeast Asia 
Remittances sent to the Southeast Asia region are of significant size. With almost 13 million 
migrants living abroad, Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most active remittance markets. 
The largest outflow of migrants is from the Philippines with 4 billion emigrants the last 
decade, and Malaysia has the largest inflow with 2 billion immigrants (IFAD, 2014). 
 
In a global perspective, the Philippines is the third largest receivers of remittances after India 
and China with an inflow of US$ 24,6 billion in 2012,.7 Of the ASEAN countries Indonesia is 
12th on the list, with an inflow of US$ 7,2 billion in 2012. Following Indonesia is Thailand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Data from the World Bank database 
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(US$ 4,7 billion), Malaysia (US$ 1,3 billion), Cambodia (US$ 172 million) and Lao PDR 
(US$ 58 million). Vietnam received US$ 8,6 billion of remitted money in 2011, but has no 
registered figures for 2012. Also, as percentage of GDP, the Philippines receives the most 
remittances, with 9,8% in 2012, followed by Thailand (1,3%), Cambodia (1,2%), Indonesia 
(0,8%), Lao PDR (0,6%) and Malaysia (0,4%). In 2011 Vietnam received remittances equal 
to 6,3% of GDP.8 
 
The outflow of migrants and inflow of remittances in South Asian countries have increased 
significantly during the past decades. One of the main driving forces behind this is the 
increased economic activity in the Gulf region and the increase in the price of oil. Migration 
has provided a source of income and employment to countless workers from the South Asian-
region, which is know for having a labor surplus. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the total amount of remittances into the ASEAN in 2010 and the shares into 
the different countries. The Philippines alone received more than half of the total amount of 
remittances into the region. Other major recipients are Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand. At 
the same time, Malaysia is a small receiver of remittances, but with an expanding market like 
the market of Singapore, Malaysia attracts a large number of migrants and the outflow of 
remittances from Malaysia is larger than the inflow (IFAD, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Remittances and migration in the ASEAN countries9 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Data from the World Bank database 
9 Remittances data from the World Bank database and migration data from IFAD (2014)	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Figure 2.3: Remittances into ASEAN 
 
 
The inflow of remittances into the region, as shown in Figure 2.4, has steadily increased from 
1980 to 2010, with a growth rate between 1% and 3%. From the graph, it is not clear whether 
the financial crisis of 1997 had any impact on remittances, but it seems more likely that 
remittances is less prone to external events, and therefore a less volatile flow than other 
financial flows.  
 
 
2.1.3 Remittances into the Philippines 
Since the flow of remittances is expected to have a greater impact on the economy in the 
Philippines, this part will describe some of the aspects of the inflow to the Philippines.  
 
Remittances have been a pillar in the Philippine economy, and for many families and 
households it is the main source of income. Remittances from Overseas Filipino workers 
(OFWs) have had a huge impact on the economy in the Philippines. According to Abinales 
and Amoroso (2005, p.256), remittance protected the Philippines during the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 from the same impact that the crisis had on other Southeast Asian countries. 
This was due to the Philippines low exposure to external debt since the Philippine investment 
market was less attractive for foreign investors than other Asian markets. In addition the 
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Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Central Bank in the Philippines, BSP) was imposing strong 
capitalization requirements. When the crisis struck in 1997, remittances accounted for 20 
percent of export earnings. 
 
The overseas workers bring knowledge and skills back home, as well as economic impact 
through remitted money. Overseas workers annually send home over US$ 20 billion in 
remittances to their families and communities back in the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, 2015). And these numbers only account for transfers through official banks. A huge 
contribution to this constant increase in remittances is the improved accessibility to transfers 
through official channels such as banks and money transfer operators, and improved 
technology to make the remittance sending cost-effective. Remittances account for about 
10% of GDP and therefore “… making overseas employment among the most important 
sources of the Philippines export earnings” (IOM, 2013, p. 7).10 
 
The main driver in the Philippine migration policy came with the establishment of the Labor 
Code in 1974. The policy was created to promote and assist overseas employment, protect the 
migrants’ rights and to maximize the benefits. The program was introduced as a temporary 
measure to improve the economy. Further more the policy has been developed with the 
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act 8042) that was further 
altered in 2007 and 2010 (Republic Act 10022) (IOM, 2013, p.8). Philippines labor migration 
policy has always alternated between promotion and protection, and between encouragement 
and regulation. The tension between the two objectives explains the variety of measures that 
have been adopted and the comprehensive framework where every aspect of the migration 
process has received policy attention. The government has three main objectives: promote 
overseas labor, protect Filipino migrants and maximize the benefits of migration (IOM, 
2013).  
 
To increase the amount of remittances through official channels, the Philippine government 
has undertaken policies during the beginning of the 2000s to ensure secure and fast delivery 
at a lower cost, particularly from the main source countries like the US and the UK. In June 
2006 the BSP issued Circular No.534. This requires banks and non-bank financial institutions 
to post the charges for their various remittance products, including classification of costs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 More about remittances channels in part 3.2.3 
	   11	  
estimated delivery time to beneficiaries, product/service description, and directory of 
remittance centers and branches, to promote the efficient delivery of competitively priced 
remittance services by banks and other financial institutions. In March 2007 the BSP 
launched an OFW portal with specific pages in the BSP website, that link the users to the 
financial institution’s relevant information on remittances (IOM, 2013).  
 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) conducts a survey about consumer expectations that gives 
indicators on the use of remitted money. The Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) was first 
conducted in 2004 and measures the consumers’ beliefs and confidence in the economics 
future. According to the CES 2012 (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2012), 95,4% of remittances 
was used to buy food, 68,8% was used on education, 65,5% on medical care and 44,1% on 
debt payments. These data confirm other surveys and research about the use of remittances, 
among others Bagasao (2005) list basic households needs, education, medical expenses and 
payments of debt as some of the applications of remittances. Other studies highlight the long 
term beneficial effect of remittances that are spent on improving the life quality for the 
families back home, money invested in better food, housing and education. Orbeta (2008) 
concludes that remittance-receiving households spend more capital on human resource 
development than non-receiving households.  
 
As well as remitting to their families, many migrants raise funds to small infrastructure 
projects and other humanitarian causes in the Philippines. These includes school buildings, 
hospitals, churches, water well, medical missions, support of street children and orphans 
(Bagasao, 2005). In 2011 The National Economic and Development Authority implemented 
the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), under the United Nations Development 
Program and with support from the Western Union Foundations. The project supports local 
administrators in developing policies for multi-stakeholder to cooperate on a pool of 
remittances. Since many of the overseas Filipino workers are interested in supporting local 
development initiatives the pool has the purpose of using remittances as a source of 
knowledge and ideas. A part of the program is called “Youth Leaders in the Diaspora”, this 
initiative targets third generation overseas Filipinos who are considered innovators and 
achievers in their sector and community, to contribute in the Philippines. The programs aim 
is to promote the Filipino identity, good governance and leadership, volunteerism and social 
responsibility, and diaspora to development (IOM, 2013).   
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Table 2.3: Money flows into the Philippines11 
Year Remittances % of 
GDP 
Foreign direct 
investments % of 
GDP 
Official 
development aid % 
of GDP 
1980 1,93 −0,33 0,92 
1985 2,62 0,04 1,49 
1990 3,31 1,20 2,87 
1995 7,23 1,99 1,22 
2000 8,59 2,76 0,71 
2005 13,32 1,61 0,55 
2010 10,80 0,54 0,27 
 
There are incontrovertible facts highlighting the relevance of remittance for the Philippine 
economy. During the last 30 years, the amount of remittances has gradually increased, 
accounting for 13% of GDP in 2005. Compared to Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and 
Official Development Aid (ODA) as percent of gross domestic product (GDP), they 
respectively account for 1,61% and 0,55%. Remittances contribute to an increase in the 
overall supply of foreign exchange that the Philippines use to purchase imported items such 
as crude oil and machinery. According to IOM (2013), remittance regarded as a support to 
economic growth as a driver of consumption expenditure, which constitutes more than 52% 
of gross national income (GNI). Other ways remittances contribute to economic growth is 
through generating employment through increased entrepreneurship, and thereby increasing 
the base of taxpayers, and increased household savings. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Data from the World Bank 
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3 Review of the theory of migration and 
remittances 
 
This theoretical chapter will cover theories about migration and theories about remittances 
including determinants and the cost of remitting money. The reason for including theory 
about migration is due to the relationship between migration and the flow of remittances, and 
that several determinants of remittances relates to reasons for migration.  
 
 
3.1 Theory of Migration 
“Migration	  is	  often	  a	  collective	  action,	  arising	  out	  of	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  
change	  and	  affecting	  the	  whole	  society	  in	  both	  sending	  and	  receiving	  areas”.12	  
 
The United Nations defines a migrant as a person that for any reason has lived away from the 
country of origin for more than a year (IOM, 2015). 
 
Statistics from the United Nations show that there are about 214 million international 
migrants, which constitutes roughly 3% of the world’s population. The number of internal 
migrants is estimated to be 8% (381 million migrants) of the world’s population (IOM, 
2013).13 There are several different categories of migrants, voluntary or forced and legal or 
illegal (Koser, 2007). A refugee or asylum-seeker is a forced migrant due to political or 
environmental reasons, while most labor migrants are legal and voluntary. Due to the 
uncertainty about the size of illegal migrants all statistics about migrants are estimates. At the 
same time, many labor migrants move to countries with an agreement about free movement. 
As a result the migrants never have to register as a labor migrant in the new country, and are 
therefore hard to accurately measure. An example is the flow of migrant labor from Nepal to 
India, as Nepali citizens are not required to apply for permits to work in India (Dahal, 2014). 
 
The theories of migration during the past 70 years have moved from an optimistic view to a 
pessimistic view, and then back again. According to de Haas (2008) the latter change is due 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Castles (2014, p.25) 
13 Estimates from 2012	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to the increase in remittance flows, and the belief that remittances are a better way to reduce 
poverty and increase economic growth in developing countries. In the 1950s and 1960s the 
main theory was a neo-classical theory with a positive view on development, including the 
Gravity Model and the Todaro Model. During the late 1970s and 1980s a historical-structural 
theory with roots in Marxist political economy, was the main focus with concerns about brain 
drain and integration. In the 1990s as a critical response to earlier theories, a new theory 
called new economics of labor migration (NELM) became the central theory, with a positive 
view on migration. After 2000, remittances have improved the positive view on migration 
(Lamvik, 2012; Castles, 2014; de Haas, 2008; Massey, 1993). 
 
As early as 1885 geographer Ravenstein expressed his “Laws of Migration” that based 
migration purely on economical reasons. Since then several explanations for migration have 
followed, such as the Gravity model that predicts the migration streams to be based on 
distances and population size, and “Push-and-Pull” model determining economic, 
environmental and demographical reasons for why people migrate (Castles, 2014). 
 
 
3.1.1 Neo-classical theory 
The Neo-classical migration theory can be separated into two main categories: micro-level 
and macro-level. Wage, labor possibilities and migrations costs are determinants for both 
categories (Massey, 1993). The neo-classical macro-level theory suggests that labor moves 
because of wage differences, from low-wage countries to high-wage countries, and that 
capital will move in the opposite direction. Low-wage countries have relatively more labor 
and the large supply of labor keeps the wages low. High-wage countries have relatively more 
capital and this is the reason capital will move towards low-wage countries and labor towards 
high-wage. As this movement takes place, the salaries will move towards a common level. In 
the long run, according to the neo-classical theory, the migration stream will decline because 
the wage convergences will reduce the incentives to move. This can be explained in the same 
way as the Harris-Todaro model with rural-urban migration and fixed amount of labor in a 
country. 
 
Labor migrations from rural areas to urban areas (as from poor to rich countries), as long as 
the wage in urban sector is higher than in rural sector ( w(u) > w(r) ). As more labor moves 
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from rural (poor) to urban (rich) areas, the wage level will equalize and more people will be 
hired in the urban sector. 
 
Figure 3.1: Harris-Todaro model 
 
 
The micro perspective of neo-classical migration theory explains migration through cost-
benefit analysis as individuals wish to maximize their private income. Individuals consider 
their net return of migration before making a decision. If the probability of getting work, and 
expected income abroad is greater than the cost of migration and opportunities at home, the 
individual may find it attractive to migrate. But because of the individual choice at the micro-
level, different individuals have different net return of migration (Massey, 1993; de Haas, 
2008; Castles, 2014). 
 
 
3.1.2 Historical-structural theory 
In the 1970s and 1980s, as a critical response to the neo-classical migration theory, a theory 
with roots in Marxist political economy called historical-structural theory was developed. 
This theory focused on large-scale employment of labor stating that migration was not a free 
choice of individuals, but that the traditional economic system forced people to migrate to 
maintain the unequal distribution of resources between rich and poor countries. Castles 
(2014, p.32) explains the view on migration as a way of preserving the cheap flow of labor 
into rich, capital-intensive countries. This dependency theory argues that migration causes 
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underdevelopment and does not promote development in poor countries (Castles, 2014; de 
Haas, 2008). 
 
 
3.1.3 New economics of labor migration 
New economics of labor migration (NELM) came in the 1990s as a critical response to earlier 
migration theories, especially the neo-classical.  The essence of this theory is that the 
decision of migration is no longer an individual choice. It is a collective decision made by a 
family or household. Decisions about migration are made to maximize household income, as 
well as minimize risk and loosen constraints related to market failures. Remittances can work 
as an insurance against future risk, since the family depends on different income sources. 
Remittances are also seen as capital for investments, when there is no access to public or 
private insurance and credit markets (Massey, 1993; Taylor and Martin, 2001; de Haas, 
2008). 
 
 
3.2 Theory of Remittances 
Remittances are the flow of money from migrants abroad to their families in their country of 
origin (Koser, 2007). In other worlds, remittances are foreign exchange that is remitted 
through individuals living abroad. The term remittances only refer to financial contributions 
and transfers, and therefore not include other transfers such as technology and information 
(Eversole, 2005). According to Carling (2008) is the prospect of remitting often a key 
element in the motivation to migrate. 
 
The flows of remittances globally have rapidly increased in the last couple of decades. In 
1990 the amount was estimated to be US$ 67,8 billion. This number doubled during the next 
ten years, amounting to US$ 135,5 billions in 2000, 60% of this is transferred to developing 
countries (Gammeltoft, 2002). Remittances are a larger source of income than official 
development aid in developing countries, and the gap between the two money flows have 
kept increasing. At the same time remittances are a more stable source of income than other 
flows, especially compared to foreign direct investments that tend to be more volatile and 
limited (Gammeltoft, 2002). Overseas migrants are more likely to continue to invest in their 
home country despite economic difficulties, than what foreign investors are (Ratha, 2005). 
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This stability has encouraged emerging markets to use remittances as a security, instead of 
borrowing on international capital markets. Another contrast between international capital 
flows and remittances is that remittances are significantly higher in countries with high risk 
(measured by Institutional Investor rating14) and in countries with a high level of debt relative 
to GDP. 
 
Remitted money can be transferred through either a formal channel or an informal channel. 
Over US$ 300 billion were transferred worldwide in 2007, through official remittance 
channels as money transfer operators, and it is predicted that billions more were transferred 
through unofficial channels (Barajas et al., 2009). This thesis will be based on data from the 
formal and official flow of remittances, due to difficulties with estimating the amount 
through unofficial channels. Data retrieved from the World Bank and IMF is based on official 
transferred remittances records. 
 
The global stock of migrants affects more people than just the migrant alone, since the 
migrant typically leaves several family members behind and supports them through 
remittances. Millions of people are directly affected by remittances, and the remitted money 
are generally spent to lift people out of poverty through consumption (food, clothing, 
medicine, shelter) (Barajas et al., 2009). Remittance supplements the recipients’ income and 
increases their country’s foreign exchange reserves. Remittance contributes to output growth 
through consumption, as this generates positive multiplier effects, and through investments in 
local markets. Thus, the money flow might offset some of the output losses that the country 
may suffer from emigration of high skilled workers (Ratha, 2005). Adelman and Taylor 
(1990) found that for every dollar Mexico receives from workers abroad, the gross national 
product (GNP) increase by US$ 2,49 and US$ 3,17, depending on whether an urban or a rural 
household received the remittances. The difference between urban and rural is justified by the 
tendency that rural households tend to consume more domestically produced goods and 
hence generate larger multiplier effects than urban households. Lowell and de la Garza 
(2000) also found that, even when not invested, remittances have an important multiplier 
effect since money spent on basic needs stimulate retail sales, which further stimulates 
demand for goods and services leading to increased output and employment.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Institutional investors rating is an indicator used to identify and measure economic conditions of booms and 
crisis and the country risk refers to a collection o frisks related to investing in a foreign country. This is an 
important consideration for individuals and institutions interested in foreign investments.  
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3.2.1 Theories of remittances 
The literature on remittances can be divided into two segments. The first focus on 
macroeconomic impact of remittances and a large share of the literature focus on the impact 
remittances have on a family’s consumption. The second focus on the causes and uses of 
remittances, and emphasizes the role of altruism and family ties as a motivation for 
remittances. This section will look at three types of remittances theory related to altruism and 
the role of family ties. 
 
Lucas and Stark (1985) distinguish between three types of remittance theory, which all 
predict that remittances increase with migrant’s income: (i) pure altruism, (ii) pure self-
interest, and (iii) tempered altruism. Altruism refers to the willingness of a migrant to provide 
financial assistance to someone in the need of it, and in this case to the family at the place of 
origin (Bouhga-Hagbe, 2006).  
 
Pure altruism requires that a person is willing to sacrifice something, like consumption, for 
another person without considering personal gain. The theory of pure altruism assumes that 
the migrant maximizes his own utility, um, with respect to the amount remitted (r), since the 
family at the place of origin will gain from increased income that implies increased 
consumption: 
 𝑢! = 𝑢 𝑐! 𝑤 − 𝑟 , 𝑎!𝑢 𝑐!!!!!  
 
The utility of the migrant, um, is derived from the utility of those left at home that are 
dependent on per capita consumption in place of origin, ch. The migrant’s consumption is cm, 
ah is the altruism weights attached to household members, w is the migrant’s wage abroad 
and n is the household size. Assuming that consumption per capita is increasing with income 
per capita available at home, where y is the income per capita before any remittances. Then 
the migrant choose a level to remit provided by 
 𝑟 = 𝑟 𝑤,𝑦,𝑛  
 
	   19	  
From the assumption that the migrant cares about his home family and their utility, the 
prediction is that 𝜕𝑟 𝜕𝑤 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝜕𝑟 𝜕𝑦 < 0 
 
Meaning that the amount of remitted money will increase with the migrant’s wage rate and 
decrease with the income per capita at home. The pure altruism model shows the migrant 
care about the well being of the family left behind (Strubhaar and Vãdean, 2006). Antonidas 
et al. (2013) find that altruism can have a significant effect on the remitting behavior of 
certain migrants, depending on the possession of loan obligations at the place of origin, held 
by the migrant. Loan obligations refer to property related loans, marriage expenses, personal 
loans and educational expenses, among others. Migrants without loan obligations are less 
certain about the expectations for remittances, than those with explicit loan obligations.  
 
The pure self-interest model is a stark contrast to the pure altruism view, because the pure 
self-interest view has three reasons to remit, purely based on selfish motivations. The first 
motivation is the ambition to inherit property in the country of origin. With this motivation, 
the money is sent home with intentions of using it for investments today, which the migrant 
can inherit in the future. The second motivation is related to the intention of investing in the 
home area with the remitted money and that the family will maintain the property until the 
migrant returns. The last one is based on making the transition home easier for the migrant so 
the remitted money is used to invest in either fixed capital such as land or livestock, in public 
assets such as political influence, or in social assets (Lucas and Stark, 1985).  
 
The last theory of remittances is the tempered altruism, which view remittances as a part of 
an intertemporal, mutually beneficial contractual arrangement between migrant and home. 
Investment and risk may cause the arrangement. In developing countries education is often 
costly and usually borne by the immediate family. Lucas and Stark (1985) refer to studies 
like Johnson and Whitelaw (1974), which find a positive association between the amount 
remitted and the education of the migrant. The investment argument would therefore predict 
that the effect on education of increased remittances should be greater among the immediate 
family than the extended. The other underlying factor of the mutually contract is that in 
economies without complete insurance and capital markets, the act of migration is an 
insurance against risk through several income sources. Remittances would flow to the family 
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in times of crop failures or other reasons for a change in income, and to the migrant during 
times of unemployment. The only criterion for this type of motivation to remit is that the 
arrangement has to be voluntary and self-enforcing (Lucas and Stark, 1985).  
 
 
3.2.2 Determinants of remittance 
The determinants of remittances are strongly linked to the theory of migration, as remittances 
are the economic contribution of migrants into labor-sending areas. The setting of migration 
differs depending on whether the migration is temporary or permanent, or international or 
internal. The macro-level perspective of remittances is looking at how the flow responds to 
key macroeconomic variables such as exchange rate, imports, exports and the stock of 
migrants. The micro-level determinants of remittances look at two household perspectives: 
the migrant’s remittance-sending pattern and the receiving parts use of the received 
remittances (Carling, 2008). 
 
The level of remittance flows depends on migrants’ ability to remit, their motivation and 
willingness. The first relates to their income and savings, while the latter two are determined 
by the duration of migration and the family situation both at home and in the country of 
destination. 
 
Related to a migrant’s ability to remit is the income level of the migrant. That not all 
migrants remit money applies to individual characteristics such as education and gender, but 
income in particular. The migrant’s income has been found to have a positive effect on 
remittances, but it is not necessarily a correlation between income and the amount remitted, 
as many migrants give a high priority to help their family back home. Lucas and Stark (1985) 
hypothesized that migrants remit as repayment of the costs their families have incurred for 
their education, and found empirical evidence for this. While Posel (2001) find evidence that 
woman remit a substantially larger proportion of their wage than male migrants.  
 
Related to a migrant’s motivation to remit is the family situation both at home and abroad. 
According to Carling (2008), demographics and kinship variables have an effect on whether a 
migrant remits or not. If the migrants’ have a spouse, children or parents in the country of 
origin then it is more likely that they will remit. Carling (2008) also states that there is a 
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positive association between remittances and the household size at origin, and a negative 
association to the household size at the place of destination. A study by Koncia and Filer 
(2005) find an inverse relationship between remittances and the number of emigrants from 
the same households. A migrant is less likely to remit a proportion of his income if a sibling 
has emigrated as well. Also the time spent abroad affect the likelihood of remitting money 
since the ties to the home community weakens with time.  
 
 
3.2.3 Remittance corridors and the cost of remitting 
Carling (2008) considers whether a country-to-country remittance corridor affect the amount 
of money transferred and finds that a remittance corridor makes it easier and relatively 
cheaper to remit, and that the likelihood of remittances being sent is greater with high-quality 
and low-cost services. A remittance corridor is typically between two countries where 
migration is common, such as between the United Kingdom and Somalia or between Norway 
and Poland (Carling, 2008, p.593). The World Bank15 reports the most common remittance 
corridors to the ASEAN countries as listed in the Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Remittances corridors to ASEAN countries 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 World Bank (2015) 
Receiving 
country 
Corridors to 
Indonesia Malaysia Netherlands 
 Singapore United States 
Malaysia Singapore  
Philippines Australia Canada 
 Italy Japan 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
 Qatar Saudi Arabia 
 United States  
Thailand Singapore United States 
Vietnam Australia Canada 
 Czech Republic France 
 New Zealand South Korea 
 United States  
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By strengthening the financial sector infrastructure in both the source and recipient countries, 
the remittance flows could increase through the formal channels. The transaction costs often 
exceed 20% of the amount remitted. According to the Economist (2010), transferring money 
through banks is the most expensive as they on average charge 13% of the amount, while 
post offices and money-transfer operators charge 9% and 7% respectively. Included in 
Appendix 3 is the estimated cost of sending remittances to the Philippines. The cost vary 
between no cost from United States to the Philippines, and the largest cost from Canada to 
the Philippines with a cost of sending of 25,39% of the transferred amount. 
 
The Economist (2010) also finds that the cost of sending remittances is negatively correlated 
with the number of migrants and services providers, so more competition reduces the cost of 
transferring. This coincides with Carling’s (2008) conclusion regarding the remittances 
corridors. The IMF (2011) also states the same findings, and highlights that if the cost of 
transferring money is reduced by 5%, migrants and recipients could save about US$16 billion 
each year. 
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4 Review of empirical analyses of 
remittances 
 
In this section some previous literature on the topic, impact of remittances on economic 
growth, will be covered. Studies on the effect of remittances on economic growth and 
financial development have different results.  
 
The impact of remittances on Asian countries is studied several times, largely due to the 
large, high-skilled migration flow out of this region. Cooray (2012), Siddique et al. (2012) 
and Salahuddin (2013) all look at some of the South Asian countries, while Dahal (2014) 
focus on Nepal and Ang (2007) focus on the Philippines. Jongwanich (2007) expands the 
area of interest and include the entire Asian region and the Pacific states.  
Cooray (2012) tries to identify the contribution of migrant remittances on economic growth 
in South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), and finds that 
remittances have a positive and significant effect on economic growth when education levels 
and financial sector development are comparatively high. Siddique et al. (2012) researched 
whether remittances had any effect on the economies of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, 
and found mixed results. Using a Vector Autoregression with time series over 25 years, they 
found a significant impact of growth in remittances on economic growth in Bangladesh and 
that it was a one-way causal relationship. For India they found no significant results and 
therefore no causal relationship between the two variables, but for Sri Lanka it was a two-
way direct causality. In other words, growth in remittances into Sri Lanka promotes 
economic growth and vice versa. Related to this relationship they highlight that migrants 
from Sri Lanka are a unique group as most of them come from families living above the 
poverty line. This can support the two-way causal relationship because the receiving families 
use the money for investments like education, not in the necessity of survival. Siddique et al. 
(2012) concludes that it is not possible to reject that remittances have an impact on the 
economy. Although there was no significant effect on India this does not mean that the flow 
of remittances into India cannot make a change for poor, rural families. Salahuddin (2013) 
also find a long-run positive relationship confirming that remittance spurs economic growth, 
with evidence from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the Philippines. The author also 
conclude that remittances have short-run effects on poverty reduction in small economies 
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through investments in productive sectors such as infrastructure and education, and that 
larger economies, like India, can benefit from remittances income especially to reverse brain 
drain. Studying the effect of remittances on growth and poverty rates in both Asia and the 
Pacific, Jongwanich (2007) find strong evidence that remittances have a significant effect on 
poverty reduction in the region, but only a marginal impact on economic growth.  
Remittances effect poverty reduction through increased income, consumption smoothing and 
easing capital constraints, and effect growth through domestic capital and human capital 
development. Dahal’s (2014) study indicates a mixed impact on remittances inflow on 
economic growth in Nepal. The study analyses the impact through financial development, 
productivity, international trade and human capital accumulation, and lists positive and 
negative impacts remittances have on these determinants of economic growth. Positive 
impacts of remittances on financial development include increased bank deposits and credits, 
and negative impacts include increased inflation through exchange rate appreciation and 
increased money supply. Productivity can be positively affected by remittances through 
promotion of entrepreneurship and transfers of knowledge and skill, while productivity can 
be negatively affected through promoting corruption. Dahal (2014) finds that remittances into 
Nepal have positive relations regarding financial development and human capital 
accumulation, and negative relations regarding productivity and international trade. Ang 
(2007) looks at four areas including remittance and overall growth, the linkage between 
remittances and microfinance, tracing the contribution of remittances to countryside 
development and the relationship between worker remittances and structural reform policies. 
The findings show that on a national level that remittances have a positively and significantly 
influence on economic growth. 
 
In other regions of the world, the same relations between remittances and economic growth 
have been studied. Orrenius et al. (2009) studies the impact in Mexican states, and Glytsos 
(2002) looks at five Mediterranean countries. 
Orrenius et al. (2009) estimates the impact in Mexican states, by looking at the effect on 
macroeconomic variables such as wages and employment in the formal sector, 
unemployment rates, wage inequalities and school enrolment rates. Their basis for the paper 
is that through macroeconomic theory remittances can boost aggregate demand and thereby 
GDP and economic growth, but also that remittances can increase income inequalities and 
reduce labor supply. Their finding is that remittances have several positive effects on the 
Mexican economy, such as increased average wages and employment rates. But they find no 
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effect on the school enrolment rates. Glytsos (2002) estimates short- and long-run multiplier 
effects of exogenous shocks of remittances in five Mediterranean countries. His estimated 
model shows a great structural consistency, but it also exhibits the relative significance of 
country specific conditions. The short- and long-run distinction of remittance effects 
uncovers different inter-country priorities of spending remittances on consumption, 
investment or imports.  
 
Yaseen (2012) and Berguellil et al. (2013) uses a different approach to find the impact of 
remittances on economic growth, as they divide different countries into groups.  
Using a panel data over two groups of countries Barguellil et al. (2013) try to find the 
relationship between the variables of interest; remittances, economic growth and education. 
The first group in their regression consists of ten countries with remittances as a large share 
of GDP (such as Nepal and Lesotho), and the other consists of ten countries with large total 
amount of received remittances (such as China and India). Their findings are inconclusive. In 
the first group they find a positive, but insignificant relation between remittances and 
education, and that remittances have a negative impact on economic growth. When they 
include the second group, the significant effect disappears. Yaseen (2012) uses panel data 
estimation over the MEAN countries16 to observe the impact of remittances on economic 
growth. Some of these countries are net providers of remittances, such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Countries, and others are known to receive large amounts of 
remittances, such as Jordan and Lebanon. With a fixed effects approach Yaseen points that 
institutions and financial development play an important role in how remittances affect 
economic growth. Through financial development remittances are found to have a mixed 
effect on the economies, but that remittances promote growth by complementing total 
liquidity and by substituting credit. 
 
Other studies use bigger datasets including over 80 countries to estimate the impact, such as 
Catrinescu et al. (2006), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) and Barajas et al. (2009). The 
basis for the paper by Catrinescu et al. (2006) is the discussion whether remittances 
contribute to long-term growth through building human and financial capital, or if 
remittances reduce long-term growth through labor substitutions and Dutch disease effects. In 
the dataset, observations from 162 countries over 34 years are included. As a conclusion they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Marocco, Oman, Syria, Lebanon and Tunisia 
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reject that remittances have a negative impact on economic growth, and points out that the 
quality of institutions play an important role in how remittances affect economic growth. 
Using internal instruments (lagged explanatory variables) and generalized method of 
moments (GMM) with a dataset covering 100 countries over the period 1975-2002, Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) regress per capita GDP growth on total remittance-to-GDP ratio with 
several conditions related to human capital and institutional quality. They find no statistically 
significant effect of remittances on economic growth, but they found support to that 
remittances relax credit constraints, hence that remittances have a positive effect on growth 
only in countries with small financial sectors. Barajas et al. (2009) focus on appropriate 
measurements and could not find a robust and significant positive impact of remittance on 
long-term growth, but they found a negative relationship between remittances and growth. 
They conclude that “Remittances lift people out of poverty but they do not typically turn their 
recipients into entrepreneurs.”  
 
 
The empirical literature on the effects of remittance flows on growth appears to be 
inconclusive, as seen in the studies discussed above. According to Barajas et al. (2009) this 
can be traced to several sources. The first relates to how the different studies define 
remittances, as there are a large difference between the behavior of employee compensation 
and migrant transfers, and workers’ remittances. Employee compensations are often seasonal 
labor and migrant transfers are one-time movement of funds. For the most, the above studies 
simply use a combination of the three categories and call it “workers’ remittances”. The 
second source relates to how to identify the effects, either through cross-sections, annual 
panels or with different estimators. And the third source relates to the dataset estimates, 
differences in time periods and set of countries included. Which control variables for 
economic growth that are included can cause the fourth source of disparity, and the last 
source relates to the choice of variables used as instruments for remittance flows.  
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5 Empirical analysis of the impact of 
remittances on the ASEAN countries 
 
The findings in previous literature either find a positive impact or that remittances have no 
impact on economic growth. The motivation for my empirical analysis is even though similar 
research have been conducted, no one (at least among the studies I have been able to find) 
have yet to study the impact of remittances on ASEAN economies. Most of the studies either 
focus of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or South Asia (Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Sri 
Lanka and Pakistan among others). 
 
The main research question of this thesis is to find the impact of remittances on economic 
growth, in the ASEAN countries. In order to study this, I have constructed a dataset with 
statistics on seven of the ten ASEAN countries, covering the years 1980-2012. The dataset is 
stated as strongly balanced in STATA, but the time series differ in length between the 
countries. To keep it simpler, I follow the mainstream literature and assume reasons for the 
missing data is not correlated with the error terms in the regression and that the estimations 
therefore are valid. The following sections describe data and variables, before I present the 
model and results. All regressions, estimations and figures in this chapter are done with own 
calculations in the statistics program STATA. 
 
 
5.1 Data 
The dataset is constructed with observations from 1980-2012, for seven of the ASEAN 
countries: the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (PDR) and Cambodia. The reason for not including the last three members of 
ASEAN, Singapore, Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam, is due to lack of data available. All 
raw data are collected from the World Development Indicators (The World Bank) and the 
CEIC Global database.17  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Raw data collected from the World Bank and CEIC database, see Bibliography 
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All the time periods are included in the dataset and estimations, but the number of 
observations for each variable varies between 231 (for variables such as population growth 
and life expectancy) and 62 for the poverty variable because the raw data is only constructed 
every other year.18 The problem that could arise from having few observations is that the 
observations could be unrepresentative or omitted, which the resulting coefficient could be a 
poor guide on the impact of remittances on economic growth. Using a dataset with few 
observations can possibly make the OLS regression very sensitive to large outliers. Accepting 
the possible problem with few observations, I still assume that the estimations are valid and 
rather be skeptical to the results.  
 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
This section will cover descriptive statistics about the dependent and independent variable, 
over the time period 1980-2012 and across the seven countries in the dataset.  
 
The dependent variable in the model is the variable for economic growth, and it is defined as 
the GDP per capita annual growth. The data for this variable is collected from the World 
Bank, which defines it as the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 
on constant local currency. Definition of GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products (Smukkestad, 2008). In this thesis referring to economic growth relates 
to the growth in GDP.  
 
The independent variable is the variable for personal remittances as ratio of GDP 
(!"#$%%&'("!"# ∗ 100). The flow of remittances into the ASEAN countries have increased 
steadily and therefore interesting to see the effects of this addition capital on the economy. 
The World Bank defines the flow of remitted money as all private current transfers in cash or 
in kind made by residents of a households living abroad.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Appendix 2 
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Growth rates for ASEAN 1980-2012 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the GDP growth for the seven ASEAN countries has in the time 
period between 1984 and 2012 been relatively similar, with few outliers. In the 1980s the 
Philippines generally had a lower economic growth than the other countries, most likely due 
to political instability under President Marcos dictatorship (IOM, 2013).19 The second large 
fluctuation is similar for several of the countries and relates to the Asian Financial Currency 
Crisis of 1997-1998. The growth rates in the affected countries dropped below zero in the 
years of the crisis, but quickly recovered. The last visible variation is the growth rate of 
Cambodia, which has been generally higher during the beginning of 2000s. Apart from these 
three noticeable fluctuations have the growth rates in the ASEAN countries been stable 
between 5% and 10%.  
 
Figure 5.1: Growth rates in the ASEAN countries, 1980-2012  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ferdinand Marcos was president of the Philippines in the period between 1965-1986. September 1972 
Marcos declared martial law due to threats from a Muslim separatist movement in the south, the re-
establishment of the Filipino Communist Party and student protests. Under the martial law, Marcos increased 
the power for himself and his relatives, and he used the military as defence against his political enemies, 
displaying a ruthless approach to opposition. In 1981 lifted President Marcos the martial law and for the first 
time since 1969 were a presidential election held (Szczpanski, 2015). 
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Remittances inflow into ASEAN 1980-2012 
Figure 5.2 evidently shows the differences in remittances into the different ASEAN 
countries. The remittance to GDP ratio into the Philippines is higher for the entire time 
period, because of the substantial amounts received by the Philippine population. With the 
available data after 2000, Vietnam is a distinct number two in the received amount as 
percentage of GDP. The rest of the ASEAN countries in the dataset receive between 0% and 
5% of GDP.  
 
Figure 5.2: Remittances growth in the ASEAN countries, 1980-2012 
 
 
At the end of the 1990s, Cambodia and Lao PDR experienced a sharp shift in the inflow. 
Whether the increase in remittances into Cambodia was related to a sudden increase in 
remittances or a decrease in GDP is not possible to conclude with from this graph. But Figure 
5.2 show a decrease in the economic growth in Cambodia related to the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, and therefore it is possible to assume that the increase in remittances as 
percentage of GDP around this time is related to a fall in GDP. Opposite happened for Lao 
PDR, which experienced a sudden decrease. For Lao PDR is not possible to make the same 
conclusion, as the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 did not have the same impact on the 
economic growth. 
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5.3 Empirical specification 
Using panel data allows for several different opportunities in the estimation of impact of 
remittances on economic growth. Since remittances is measured in percentage of GDP, there 
is no need for transforming the variables since both the dependent and independent variable 
is represented as growth rates. This section will elaborate the empirical framework for the 
estimations and possible endogeneity problems that may arise related to the independent 
variable, and quite briefly explain the variables included as controls.  
 
 
5.3.1 Empirical framework 
I adopt the empirical framework used by Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2007), to estimate the 
impact of remittances on economic growth, controlling for a set of economic variables 
characterizing the economic development in the respective country.  
 𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Where 𝑌!" is the dependent variable for economic growth, 𝑅!" is the independent variable for 
remittances as percentage of GDP, and 𝑍!" is a set of control variables. I also include country 
fixed effects, 𝛼!, and time fixed effects,  𝜏!. The country fixed effect removes the effect of 
those time-invariant characteristics so we can assess the net effect of the predictors on the 
outcome variable and time fixed effects control for entity-invariant characteristics such as an 
external event affect the variables.  
  𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝜏! + 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝑍!" + 𝜀!" 
 
First, I conduct Ordinary Least Square regression including different independent variables to 
see if some of the effect of remittances is really captured by other explanatory variables. 
Then I use Instrumental Variable estimation to see if there are reasons to believe that there 
are endogeneity problems related to the remittances as percentage of GDP variable.  
 
The Ordinary Least square (OLS) method is estimated with the baseline model in the thesis: 
   log  (𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!") = 𝛽! + 𝛽!log  (𝑟𝑒𝑚!")+ 𝛽!log  (𝑍!")+ 𝜀!" 
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This model estimates the effect of remittances as percentage of GDP (𝑟𝑒𝑚!") on economic 
growth (  𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!"), and 𝑍!" is a set of control variables. The set of control variables 
include income per capita, domestic capital, population growth, trade openness represented 
by import and export as percentage of GDP, the exchange rate, estimate for life expectancy, 
poverty rate, and unemployment rate. Dependent variable, independent variable and the 
individual control variables are all transformed using logarithm. Using logarithm on the 
variables allows for interpreting the estimations in terms of percentage change. 
 
The instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV 2sls) method is also estimated with the 
baseline model, but including a first stage regression controlling for a set of variables on 
remittances as percentage of GDP.  
 1                                                                                                             log  (𝑟𝑒𝑚!") = 𝛽! + 𝛽!log  (𝑋!")+ 𝑢!" 2             log  (𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!") = 𝛽! + 𝛽!log  (𝑟𝑒𝑚!")+ 𝛽!log  (𝑍!")+ 𝜀!" 
 
The first stage regression estimates the effect of a set of economic control variables on 
remittances, including variables for trade openness (import and export as percentage of 
GDP), the exchange rate, life expectancy, poverty, and unemployment rate. The second stage 
of the regression uses the first regression as an instrumental variable, and measure the effect 
of remittances on economic growth including control variables for per capita income, 
domestic capital and population growth. Also in the IV method, all the variables are 
transformed using logarithm. 
 
 
5.3.2 Endogeneity problems and threats to validity 
In econometric modeling, variations in the dependent variable is explained by variations in 
the independent variables and by an error term, which is included to capture effects that is not 
from the independent variables. The theoretical counterpart to the empirical residuals is 
disturbance. A set of assumptions about this disturbance has to be fulfilled for the estimates 
to be unbiased, consistent and with minimum variance (BLUE-estimates) (Hill, 2001). 
1. The expectation of the disturbance is zero. 
2. The variance of the disturbances is constant and they are uncorrelated. 
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3. The values of the independent variables are not random; there is no exact linear 
relationship between any of the independent variables. 
4. The disturbance is normally distributed.  
 
It can be a problem with empirical data that the raw data seldom fulfill all these assumptions, 
especially in multiple country regressions with few observations. The estimates are not 
necessarily BLUE-estimates, but they can still be consistent and unbiased.  
 
Empirical data allows us to understand the real behavior and it is not possible to establish a 
laboratory to estimate the effects. Therefore, the estimations can be biased suffering from 
endogeneity problems. There are three circumstances under which endogeneity problems can 
be triggered:  
1. Omitted variables, 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑅! , 𝜀! ≠ 0 
2. Measurement errors in the independent variable 
3. Simultaneity 
The effect of endogeneity is bias in the estimates, and therefore possibilities of Type I Error 
(rejecting a true hypothesis) and Type II Error (failing to reject a false hypothesis). 
Endogeneity is said to occur if 𝐸(𝑅! ∗ 𝜀!) ≠ 0 (Reichstein, 2011). 
 
When expecting possible endogeneity problems, one needs to apply an Instrumental Variable 
regression to determine whether the problem exists or not. When using an Instrumental 
Variable it is necessary to determine the instruments relevance and exogeneity. To determine 
the relevance I will use a F-test, and I will assume that the instruments are uncorrelated with 
the error terms to determine the instruments exogeneity. As long as these two conditions are 
fulfilled the instruments are valid.  
 
Endogeneity problem relates to threats to internal validity and a causal relationship between 
economic growth and remittances. Using Hausman- and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is it 
possible to control for endogeneity problems. If these tests state that there is no problem, then 
the results from the OLS regression is valid and unbiased, and a give a better estimation than 
the IV regression. 
 
The Hausman test involves fitting the model by both IV and OLS, and compares a weighted 
square of the differences between the two beta-estimators. The test statistic is defined as: 
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𝑚 = (𝛽!" − 𝛽!"#)!𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝛽!"# − 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝛽!"  
 
The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared, with k degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of endogenous variables. Under the null hypothesis, the OLS estimation is the appropriate 
technique, and if rejecting the null hypothesis, the IV 2sls is the necessary estimation (Stock 
and Watson, 2012).  
 
Threats to external validity relate to differences in population and settings. Because of the 
large inflow of remittances into the Philippines, compared to the other countries, I am 
concerned about validity due to the large differences. To check for this I will exclude the data 
from the Philippines in section 5.4.3, and see whether the results change. 
 
  
5.3.3 Traditional growth theory and explanations of set of control 
variables 
I use a set of control variables in the estimations: income per capita, domestic investments, 
population growth, trade openness, exchange rate, life expectancy, poverty, and 
unemployment rate, which all will be defined below.  
 
The tradition for growth theory models have stretched over several decades and can be split 
into three sections: the Harrod-Domar growth theory in the 1940s, the “neo-classical” growth 
theory with Solow’s growth model in the 1950s, and the “endogenous” growth theory in the 
1980s (Hægeland, 2000). It started in the 1950s with Rostow’s stages growth model and the 
Harrod-Domar model. These are defined as a part of the “traditional” growth theories. 
Rostow claimed that the transition from underdevelopment to development would pass 
through different stages, from the tradition society to the age of mass consumption. Harrod-
Domar model emphasizes that the major motivator of the economy is investments (Dang and 
Sui Pheng, 2015). Before the Solow growth model, the Harrod-Domar was the most common 
approach (also referred to in part 3.1.1. Neo-classical Theory). The “traditional” theories 
were further developed in the “neo-classical” growth theories with Solow’s growth model as 
a central theory. The focus of the Solow growth model is the neoclassical aggregate 
production function (Acemoglu, 2011), and the model stresses the importance of three factors 
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of output growth. First are the increases in labor with population growth and labor quality 
through education. Second are increases in capital through savings and investments, and third 
are improvements in technology. The “neo-classical” theories were the central theories for 
several decades, before the “new” growth theory became central in the 1980s. The “new” 
growth models or “endogeneity” growth models are characterized by the mechanisms leading 
to technological progress. The model has endogenously determined technological progress 
and long-term growth rates as assumptions for the competitive equilibrium to be fulfilled 
(Hægeland, 2000). 
 
Two of the control variables in my regression, domestic investments and population growth, 
relates to Solow’s growth model, which in 1957 generated the theoretical basis for growth 
accounting. In this growth model, output is linked to capital and labor through a production 
function, f. 
 𝑌 = 𝑓 𝐾, 𝐿  
 
Y is output produced in the economy, K is capital and L is labor. The idea is that growth in 
the output is only possible from growth in the inputs, labor and capital. In the neoclassical 
approach the production function satisfies three properties: (i) positive and diminishing 
marginal products, (ii) constant returns to scale and (iii) the Inada conditions. 
 𝑖 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐾 > 0,𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐿 > 0, 𝜕!𝑓𝜕𝐾! < 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝜕!𝑓𝜕𝐿! < 0  𝑖𝑖 𝑓 𝑐𝐾, 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐𝑓 𝐾, 𝐿 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑐 ≥ 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖 lim!→! 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐾 = lim!→! 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐿 = ∞  𝑎𝑛𝑑   lim!→! 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐾 = lim!→! 𝜕𝑓𝜕𝐿 = 0 
 
This relation between output and capital and labor is the background for including domestic 
capital and population growth. The reason for including income per capita as a control is to 
create a basis of the economic level in the country, trade openness and exchange rate create a 
basis for institutional quality, a basis human capital is generated by life expectancy and the 
unemployment rate, and the rate of poverty might determine whether a migrant transfer 
remittances or not. 
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Income per capita: To estimate the initial level of income per capita, the data for adjusted 
net national income per capita in current US dollars are used, collected from the World Bank. 
This variable is defined as the gross national income (GNI) minus any consumption of fixed 
capital and natural resource depletion. GNI is the gross national income and measures 
national production and include income made abroad (Smukkestad, 2008). 
 
Domestic investments: The variable for domestic investment is measured by the gross 
capital formation (GCF) as percentage of GDP. This measures additions to the fixed assets of 
the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. 
 
Population growth: This variable is measured through the percentage increase in the 
population size from one year to the next.  
 
Trade openness: Including trade openness implies the country’s association and connection 
with the rest of the world. The variable is measured through import as percentage of GDP and 
export as percentage of GDP. Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods 
and other market services received from the rest of the world, while exports of goods and 
services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world. 
 
Exchange rate: For the exchange rate variable is the end-of-year exchange rate from the 
CEIC database used. The exchange rate is the national currency per US dollar. The currencies 
used in the ASEAN-7 countries are Philippine Pesos (PHP), Thai Baht (THB), Cambodian 
Riel (KHR), Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), Laotian Kit (LAK) and 
Vietnamese Dong (VND). 
 
Health care: Variable for life expectancy is an estimate of the total numbers of years a 
person is expected to live at birth and data retrieved from the World Bank database.  
 
Poverty: A poverty headcount ratio at US$ 1,25 a day (PPP adjusted) is used as variable for 
poverty. This is as percentage of total population.   
 
Unemployment rate: The unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force that is 
without work but available for and seeking employment. 
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5.4 Results 
To estimate the effect of remittances on the economy in the ASEAN countries, the methods 
used are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variable with Two-Stage Least 
Squares (IV 2sls), including control variables, time and country fixed effects.  
 
An endogeneity test will determine whether it is necessary to use a two-stage least squares 
regression or if the OLS is sufficient. This decision will follow after the two-stage least 
squares estimations and will make it possible to conclude which of the two estimation 
methods that are best suited to estimate the impact of remittances on economic growth.  
 
This section will first discuss results using Ordinary Least Squares method, before covering 
the Instrumental Variable method. Because of the concerns about endogeneity problems, a 
test will follow after the estimations to conclude which of the two that give the best 
estimation. Afterwards, I will exclude the data from the Philippines to control for the large 
differences between the countries in the dataset.  
 
 
5.4.1 Ordinary least squares method 
Table 5.1: Impact of remittances on GDP growth (OLS regression) 
 (1) 
GDP growth 
(2) 
GDP growth 
(3) 
GDP growth 
(4) 
GDP growth 
Remittance as 
percentage of 
GDP 
-0,0794** 
(0,0295) 
0,0129 
(0,0413) 
-0,0852** 
(0,0288) 
-0,0049 
(0,0397) 
Constant term 1,4194*** 
(0,0439) 
1,6788*** 
(0,1157) 
1,0044** 
(0,3596) 
1,4676*** 
(0,3204) 
     
Country fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
R-squared 0,0437 0,3021 0,3627 0,5870 
Adj. R-squared 0,0377 0,2701 0,1971 0,4539 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Before extending the OLS regression with control variables, I will look at the effect of 
remittances on GDP growth, described in Table 5.1. In regression (1), only the effect of 
	  38	  
remittances on economic growth is estimated, without time or country fixed effects. The 
second regression (2) includes country fixed effects, the next (3) includes only time fixed 
effects and the last regression (4), includes both country and time fixed effects. 
 
In estimation (1), the effect of remittances on economic growth is significant and negative. 
The flow of remittances varies largely between the ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia has a 
greater outflow while the Philippines has a greater inflow, than the rest of the countries. An 
increase in remittances as percentage of GDP of 1% is expected to decrease the economic 
growth by 0,08%. The effect is significant, but the R2 states that only a small fraction, 4%, of 
the variation in economic growth is explained. Therefore, one can predict that the estimates 
are weak and might change when including control variables. 
When controlling for both country- and time fixed effects in estimation (4), the estimates 
show a negative, but insignificant effect. Still the R2 states that only 58% of the variation is 
explained in the estimations, which indicate that remittances alone is not enough to estimate 
the variation in economic growth, and including more control variables might change the 
relation between the independent and dependent variable.  
 
Controlling for a set of economic variables for the ASEAN countries changes the estimation 
results slightly. In Table 5.2, estimation (1) implies a negative and insignificant relation 
between the dependent and independent variable. Here, the only significant variable is the 
negative effect of unemployment on economic growth, but the R2 shows that the model 
explains only parts of the variation in the dependent variable, 45%. Though, when including 
both country and time fixed effects, the R2 implies that large parts of the variation in the 
dependent variable is included in the model, 89,83%. The estimation still shows a negative 
and statistically insignificant impact of remittances, implying that a one percent increase in 
remittances contributes to a 0,04 percentage decrease in GDP growth. The only concern is the 
lack of observations, which could affect the estimations. Bearing in mind this problem, the 
estimation results are still strong considering the R2, and I assume that these results give an 
indication that remittances have an effect on the economy in ASEAN. 
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Table 5.2: Impact of remittances on GDP growth (OLS regression including control 
variables) 
 (1) 
GDP growth 
(2) 
GDP growth 
(3) 
GDP growth 
(4) 
GDP growth 
Remittances as 
percentage of 
GDP 
-0,0374 
(0,0664) 
0,2299 
(0,1269) 
-0,0928 
(0,0780) 
-0,0398 
(0,1849) 
Control variables:     
   Income per 
   capita 
0,0526 
(0,1537) 
0,1122 
(0,2212) 
2,3204** 
(0,6077) 
1,4013 
(1,1237) 
   Domestic  
   investments 
0,4414 
(0,2819) 
0,8990* 
(0,4321) 
1,9216* 
(0,7330) 
1,2957 
(1,1767) 
   Population 
   growth 
0,0488 
(0,1328) 
-0,4033 
(0,2327) 
-0,3501* 
(0,1568) 
-0,4155 
(0,2833) 
   Import as % 
   GDP 
-0,0939 
(0,4822) 
-1,1658 
(0,9887) 
2,8292* 
(1,0202) 
0,3703 
(2,4009) 
   Export as % 
   GDP 
-0,0072 
(0,5618) 
0,9140 
(0,8945) 
-0,9904 
(0,7462) 
1,0594 
(1,8591) 
   Exchange 
   rate 
-0,0246 
(0,0292) 
0,1944 
(0,2439) 
0,4323** 
(0,1284) 
0,3718 
(0,3738) 
   Life expectancy 1,9870 
(2,3415) 
-4,1382 
(4,9035) 
-0,5965 
(3,6258) 
-4,5441 
(7,0516) 
   Poverty 0,1419 
(0,1120) 
0,3788* 
(0,1490) 
0,4409** 
(0,1366) 
0,7137* 
(0,2684) 
   Unempl. rate -0,2328* 
(0,0919) 
-0,3572 
(0,2049) 
-0,2719 
(0,1342) 
-0,1685 
(0,2701) 
Constant term -8,2394 
(8,5903) 
14,3702 
(18,0468) 
-13,7223 
(12,4072) 
6,4715 
(27,7173) 
     
Country fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0,4538 0,6071 0,8610 0,8983 
Adj. R-squared 0,3020 0,3975 0,5432 0,4153 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
The positive results of remittance for the OLS regressions in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, 0,0129 
and 0,2299 respectively, include only country fixed effects and can be supported by findings 
by Corray in 2012. Corray (2012) consider the impact of remittances on economic growth in 
South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), and estimates the 
impact to be between 0,012 and 0,119, depending on which control variables included in the 
regression. Corray (2012) finds a strong and positive impact of remittances on economic 
	  40	  
growth, and that increasing remittances as percentage of GDP increase the impact on 
economic growth. This correlation between larger share of remittances and the impact on 
GDP growth can change the estimation results in my regression, since the Philippines receive 
a larger share of remittances than the other countries in the dataset. Therefore, after testing 
for endogeneity problems, I will exclude the data from the Philippines from the regression to 
test whether this can change the OLS estimates. Even though, it can be argued from the OLS 
regressions in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 that migrant remittances play a role in the economy.  
 
 
5.4.2 IV regression and endogeneity problems 
Ordinary Least Squares estimates are likely to be biased when any right side variable is 
endogenous. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the relationship between economic growth 
and remittances is unlikely to be unidirectional. As in the paper by Gupta et al. (2007), this 
issue is possible to tackle with a system estimation technique that allows for both economic 
growth and remittances to be determined simultaneously. The advantage with the two-stage 
least squares system is that both variables are determined endogenously.  
 
Whether the estimation has endogeneity problems or not, will determine if the estimation are 
better with OLS or with IV regression. It is necessary to look at the two-stage least squares 
estimation before determining whether the estimations have an endogeneity problem or not. 
Table 5.3 shows the Instrumental Variable two-stage least squares estimations (IV 2sls).  
 
Before estimating the IV 2sls regression, it is necessary to determine the relevance of the 
instrument, using a F-test on the instrument of interest, remittances as percentage of GDP. 
Here I use the “Rule of Thumb” to conclude, saying that the F-test value has to be greater 
than 10 for the instrument not to be weak or irrelevant. The calculation in STATA indicates 
F(1,13)=12,13, which is greater than 10. I assume from the F-test, that the instrument is 
relevant, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍! ,𝑅!) ≠ 0, and I have already assumed that instrument is not correlated to 
unobserved variation, 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑍! , 𝜀! = 0. 
 
In Table 5.3, estimation (1) include only control variables for both the first and second stage 
of the regression, while estimation (2) include country fixed effects in the second stage of the 
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regression. Estimation (3) and (4) include control variables and time fixed effects, but only 
regression (4) includes both time- and country fixed effects.  
 
Table 5.3: IV 2sls regression with GDP growth as dependent variable and remittances as 
instrument 
 (1) 
GDP growth 
(2) 
GDP growth 
(3) 
GDP growth 
(4) 
GDP growth 
Instrument:     
   Remittance as 
   percentage 
   of GDP 
-0,0223 
(0,0424) 
0,0346 
(0,0819) 
-0,0342 
(0,0460) 
0,1519 
(0,0953) 
Control variables:     
   Income per 
   capita 
-0,1158 
(0,0765) 
-0,0786 
(0,1540) 
-0,0889 
(0,0741) 
0,6053 
(0,4989) 
   Domestic  
   investments 
0,6800*** 
(0,1855) 
0,8525*** 
(0,2541) 
0,5510*** 
(0,1662) 
0,4742 
(0,3677) 
   Population 
   growth 
-0,0527 
(0,0884) 
0,0500 
(0,1447) 
-0,0911 
(0,0877) 
-0,2449 
(0,1540) 
Constant term 0,1609 
(0,5984) 
-0,3274 
(0,7911) 
0,6921 
(0,5325) 
-3,2027 
(2,6027) 
     
Country fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0,2839 0,4487 0,6182 0,7521 
Adj. R-squared 0,2148 0,2956 0,1218 0,1853 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Instrumented: Remittances 
Instruments: Income per capita, domestic capital, population growth, import and export as percentage of GDP, 
exchange rate, life expectancy, poverty rate and unemployment rate. 
 
The same pattern as under the OLS method appears. The impact of remittances on economic 
growth is estimated to be insignificant. The domestic investment rate is the only control 
variable that has a positive significant impact on economic growth.  
When country and time fixed effects are included in the estimation, the impact of remittances 
on economic growth are positive, implying that an one percent increase in remittances give 
an increase in GDP growth of 0,15 percent. Again the problem of few observations arises. 
The R2 states that the estimation explains 75% of the variation. Therefore I assume validity 
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and that, as in the OLS method, the estimates give indications that remittances have an effect 
on economic growth. 
 
After estimating the impact using both OLS and IV regression, the problem of endogeneity 
can be tested using several tests, including the Hausman test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test. Since the same estimation patterns appears in both the OLS method and the IV method, 
one can expect no endogeneity problems in the variable for remittances, and that the OLS 
gives unbiased and consistent estimates. 
 
If the estimations have an endogeneity problem, we need to be able to reject the null 
hypothesis, in other words that the estimated p-values must be smaller than the significant 
level, p < 0,05. 
 
Table 5.4: Hausman test for endogeneity problems  
Regressions: chi-squared prob > chi-squared 
Regressions including control variables only chi2(4) = 4,54 0,3384 
Regressions including control variables and country 
fixed effects 
chi2(10) = 7,04 0,7219 
Regressions including control variables and time 
fixed effects 
chi2(25) = 24,96 0,4648 
Regressions including control variables, country- 
and time fixed effects 
chi2(31) = 10,49 0,9998 
 
 
Table 5.5: Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity 
Regressions: Durbin chi2(1) Wu-Hausman 
Regressions including control variables only 0,0363 
p = 0,8490 
F(1,41) = 0,0317 
p = 0,8596 
Regressions including control variables and country 
fixed effects 
1,8380 
p = 0,1752 
F(1,35) = 1,4244 
p = 0,2407 
Regressions including control variables and time 
fixed effects 
0,4857 
p = 0,4858 
F(1,19) = 0,1984 
p = 0,6610 
Regressions including control variables, country- 
and time fixed effects 
1,6128 
p = 0,2041 
F(1,13) = 0,4619 
p = 0,5086 
H0: variables are exogenous 
 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, one can 
assume that there do not exist any endogeneity problems, and there is no causal relation 
between the economic growth and remittances as percentage of GDP. In other words, the 
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OLS method gives an unbiased and consistent estimate and these results can be used to 
conclude on the impact of remittances on economic growth.    
 
As a brief summary before excluding the data from the Philippines, by adopting the empirical 
method by Gupta et al. (2007), I found that remittances as percentage of GDP has a positive 
impact on economic growth only when using control variables and country fixed effect. The 
R2 indicates that 60% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the 
estimation. From this, I presume that the estimate including control variables and country 
fixed effects are likely to be reliable and that remittances can have an impact on the economic 
growth in these ASEAN countries. The estimation is not statistically significant, and this 
might be of two reasons. The first is that with lack of observations can the OLS regression 
give too much attention to large outliers such as the size of the inflow of remittances into the 
Philippines. And the second is the possibility that inflow of remittances into the ASEAN 
countries do not have an effect on the economic growth in the region, expect for the 
Philippines where Ang (2007) among others have found there to be a statistically significant 
effect of remittances on economic growth. Because of few observations, I have to be rather 
skeptical to the results. 
By using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and Instrumental Variable (IV) method, 
I can control for endogeneity problems including causality. The Hausman test predicts no 
endogeneity problems, and from which it is possible to conclude that there is no causal 
relationship between economic growth and remittances in this case, and that the OLS method 
give valid results.  
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5.4.3 Estimation without the Philippines 
Since the inflow of remittances into the Philippines are so much larger than into the rest of 
the ASEAN countries, I have concerns that the impact of remittances on economic growth 
relates more to the Philippines than the other countries.  
 
Since the Philippines alone receive half of the remittances into ASEAN, it is necessary to see 
the effect of remittance on economic growth in the individual countries included in the OLS 
estimation. The regression does not include any control variables in the estimation, but I 
include a dummy for the country of interest to see the effect of remittances on the individual 
countries economy. If D1=1 then only Cambodia is included and if D2=1 then only Indonesia 
is included, and so on.20  
     log  (𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ!")= 𝛽! + 𝛽!log  (𝑟𝑒𝑚!")+ 𝐷1! + 𝐷2! + 𝐷3! + 𝐷4! + 𝐷5! + 𝐷6! + 𝐷7! 
 
Table 5.6: Effect of remittances on GDP growth in the individual ASEAN countries (OLS 
regression)21 
GDP growth 
in country: 
Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam 
Remittances 
as % of GDP 
0,3077* 
(0,1081) 
-0,0471 
(0,0599) 
-0,0494 
(0,0592) 
-0,2615* 
(0,1195) 
0,5108* 
(0,2089) 
0,2023 
(1,8378) 
-0,0352 
(0,1542) 
Constant 
term 
1,5459*** 
(0,1057) 
1,4111*** 
(0,0982) 
1,2852*** 
(0,1136) 
1,2906*** 
(0,1399) 
-0,2347 
(0,4133) 
5,2652* 
(2,3699) 
6,7879*** 
(0,8790) 
 
Observations 18 28 26 23 25 33 12 
R-squared 0,3362 0,0232 0,0282 0,1858 0,2063  0,0004 0,0052 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5.6 shows that the inflow of remittances has a positive and significant effect on the 
Philippine economy and the Cambodian economy, and the estimates also show a positive 
effect of remittances on economic growth in Thailand. That remittances have a negative and 
statistically significant impact on economic growth in Malaysia, relate to the large outflow of 
remittances from the Malaysian economy. Vietnam received the second largest amount of 
remittances during the 2000s. That the effect in Vietnam is found to be weakly negative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Appendix 1 for the list of countries 
21 From own STATA calculations, see examples in Appendix 4	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could relate to the lack of available data on the inflow of remittances to Vietnam before 2000 
and the estimation show that in the case of Vietnam is only 0,5% of the variation explained. 
Because of few observations for each country are the estimations not necessarily valid, but 
we can expect that remittances have the greatest effect on the economic growth in the 
Philippines since the inflow is so much larger. 
 
Further in this section, I will exclude the data from the Philippines in the regressions and 
therefore I need to check for endogeneity problems again. The results from the Hausman test 
is stated in Table 5.7 and claims that there is no endogeneity problems when regression 
without data from the Philippines. Hence, OLS method is sufficient and unbiased.  
 
Table 5.7: Hausman test for endogeneity problems in regression without data from the 
Philippines 
Regressions: chi-squared prob > chi-squared 
Regressions including control variables only chi2(4) = 2,22 0,6960 
Regressions including control variables and country 
fixed effects 
chi2(9) = 6,05 0,7351 
Regressions including control variables and time 
fixed effects 
chi2(24) = 13,57 0,9559 
Regressions including control variables, country- 
and time fixed effects 
chi2(29) = 5,96 1,0000 
 
 
To estimate the effect of remittances of economic growth in the ASEAN countries excluding 
the Philippines, I include the same control variables as in the Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation before. In other words, include controls for income per capita, domestic 
investments, population growth, trade openness, exchange rate, life expectancy, poverty, and 
unemployment rate. Regression (1) in Table 5.8 includes only the control variables, while (2) 
includes country fixed effects. In (3) and (4) time fixed effects are incorporated.  
 
Excluding the data from the Philippines make a difference, but not of the magnitude as 
expected. The estimations are still not statistically significant. Without the Philippines 
statistics regression (4) including both time and country-fixed effects, shows a positive 
impact of remittances on economic growth, but the estimation is insignificant. At the same 
time predicts the R2 that 92% of the variation in the dependent variable, is explained by the 
model, which implies strong and reliable results. 
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Table 5.8: Impact of remittances on GDP growth excluding data from the Philippines (OLS 
regression) 
 (1) 
GDP growth 
(2) 
GDP growth 
(3) 
GDP growth 
(4) 
GDP growth 
Remittances as 
percentage of GDP 
0,0500 
(0,0657) 
0,2105 
(0,1287) 
-0,0386 
(0,0844) 
0,0756 
(0,2801) 
Control variables:     
   Income per capita 0,2220 
(0,1785) 
-0,1631 
(0,2802) 
1,5938 
(1,3012) 
-0,3090 
(2,9311) 
   Domestic 
   investments 
0,4510 
(0,2832) 
1,0448* 
(0,4540) 
-0,6946 
(1,0954) 
0,1615 
(1,9940) 
   Population growth -0,0886 
(0,1273) 
-0,3073 
(0,2349) 
-0,4182* 
(0,1752) 
-0,3163 
(0,3693) 
   Import as % of 
   GDP 
0,0514 
(0,4540) 
-0,2549 
(1,0356) 
2,0129 
(1,6595) 
-1,6375 
(5,6269) 
   Export as % of 
   GDP 
0,2804 
(0,5275) 
0,4251 
(0,9196) 
-0,0187 
(1,0019) 
3,0420 
(4,1133) 
   Exchange rate -0,0741* 
(0,0318) 
0,1030 
(0,2586) 
0,1580 
(0,3068) 
0,3510 
(0,5390) 
   Life expectancy -0,3011 
(2,2549) 
-1,7388 
(5,2686) 
-4,7513 
(5,1364) 
-7,3742 
(10,8655) 
   Poverty 0,3459* 
(0,1300) 
0,2941 
(0,1784) 
0,6575** 
(0,1874) 
0,8716 
(0,5210) 
   Unemployment 
   rate 
-0,1564 
(0,0849) 
-0,2425 
(0,2199) 
-0,1265 
(0,2445) 
-0,0714 
(0,3969) 
Constant term -1,545 
(8,1163) 
4,7460 
(19,0671) 
4,1198 
(15,1743) 
22,2756 
(47,6246) 
     
Country fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 40 40 40 40 
R-squared 0,5031 0,5975 0,8922 0,9273 
Adj. R-squared 0,3317 0,3459 0,4743 0,0548 
* p < 0,05; ** p < 0,01; *** p < 0,001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
A problem related to excluding the Philippines, is the lack of necessary observations. The 
number of observations decreases to 40, and this might not give the right picture in the 
ASEAN countries. Vietnam receives the second most remittances among the countries, but 
have few observations. With possibility of accessing these missing observations, the results 
in Table 5.8 might not have been dependent on the Philippines.  
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The small number of observations gives reasons to doubt the lack of significant results.  
Studies have found a positive relation between remittances and economic growth, also in 
some of the ASEAN countries, and this makes a greater reason to suspect that a larger set of 
available observations could have made estimation (4) in Table 5.8, statistically significant. 
Ying-Yin and Chee-Keong (2013) found a statistically significant influence of remittances on 
economic growth in Malaysia using autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model and 
Granger Causality test in the time period between 1975 and 2009. Pfau and Giang (2009) 
found a positive impact of remittances on economic inequality, which they implies that with 
new development policies can have further positive effects. The findings in Table 5.8 that are 
positive but insignificant, and with a larger dataset the results could have been stronger and 
consistent to these other studies.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis extends the existing literature by identifying the contribution of migrant 
remittances on economic growth in ASEAN. The main purpose of this thesis is to find the 
impact in seven of the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, using panel 
data for the time period from 1980 to 2012, including a set of control variables. Statistics 
from the United Nations show that there are about 214 million international migrants, which 
constitutes roughly 3 % of the world’s population (IOM, 2013), and these migrants remit an 
enormously amount of money back home. The flows of remittances in the world have rapidly 
increased in the last couple of decades. In 1990 the amount was estimated to be US$ 67,8 
billion. This number was doubled during in the next ten years, amounting to US$ 135,5 
billions in 2000. 
 
The first part of the empirical analysis focus on the seven ASEAN countries in the dataset, to 
find the impact of remittances as percentage of GDP on GDP growth. The results are 
relatively weak due to lack of observations, but since the findings are similar to other studies, 
I assume them to be valid and that remittances can have an effect on economic growth. The 
findings in this thesis are confirmed by other studies on the same topic. Salahuddin (2013) 
find a long-run positive relationship confirming that remittance spurs economic growth, with 
evidence from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the Philippines, while Jongwanich (2007) find 
strong evidence that remittances have a significant effect on poverty reduction in South Asia, 
but only a marginal impact on economic growth. These mixed results, confirms the mixed 
results found in this thesis and that the large differences in ASEAN could affect the 
estimation. The flow of remittances into the region vary largely, as the Philippines rank as the 
third largest receiver globally in 2012, followed by Vietnam (number 13, in 2011), Indonesia 
(number 15), Thailand (number 25), Malaysia (number 62), Cambodia (number 112) and Lao 
PDR (number 130). The insignificant estimation results can be because of the large 
differences, or just because the inflow of remittances do not have the same impact on the 
economic growth in all the ASEAN countries.  
 
The second part of the empirical analysis exclude the raw data from the Philippines because 
of the large differences between the amounts of remittances the Philippines receive and the 
amount the other countries receive. Remittances have been a pillar in the Philippine 
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economy, and for many families and household it is the main income source. Remittances 
from Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) have had a huge impact on the economy in the 
Philippines. Without the Philippines the estimation are still mixed, but insignificant. Studies 
like the Ying-Yin and Chee-Keong (2013) found a positive and significant impact in 
Malaysia, and it is therefore possible to assume that the estimations in this thesis are 
insignificant due to few observations, and that an expansion of the dataset would make the 
results significant. 
 
For further studies on this topic it would be natural to access raw data on all the ASEAN 
countries for the entire time period. To find available data over several decades have been a 
huge challenge for me, and extending the dataset could give a better and more robust 
analysis. Another possibility is to include more economic control variables that could have an 
effect economic growth, such as civil war or armed conflicts, inflation rate and more control 
variables describing human capital and migration. This could give a better basis for why 
some migrants choose to remit and others not remit, and how this affects the ASEAN 
countries differently.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Country descriptions 
Table A1: List of countries in dataset 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Data descriptions 
Table A2: Data descriptions of dataset 
 
 
     Vietnam         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
    Thailand         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
 Philippines         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
    Malaysia         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
         Lao         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
                                                                      
   Indonesia         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
    Cambodia         231    .1428571     .350687          0          1
Unemployment         151    4.369139    2.989162         .1       11.9
     Poverty          62    22.20613    19.23864          0      68.16
Lifeexpect~y         231    66.06862    7.297584   29.61354   75.60668
                                                                      
Inflationr~e         191    8.530471    13.52617      -1.71     128.42
      EXPGDP         208    45.53205    25.56698   2.764228   121.3118
      IMPGDP         208    47.42012    21.33401   6.341464   100.5974
Population~h         231    1.934777    .7321536   -1.13512   3.967099
      REMGDP         184    2.337469    3.094393          0   13.32405
                                                                      
      GCFGDP         199    25.17461    7.684175   6.178862    43.6401
Percapitai~e         203    1292.501    1349.375   78.13811   7979.857
   GDPgrowth         207    3.730521    3.652382  -14.38515    11.4946
        Year         231        1996    9.542582       1980       2012
     Country         231           4    2.004343          1          7
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Country Country 
number 
Cambodia 1 
Indonesia 2 
Lao PDR 3 
Malaysia 4 
Philippines 5 
Thailand 6 
Vietnam  7 
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Appendix 3: Cost of remitting to the Philippines 
Table A3: Cost of remitting money in common corridors to the Philippines 
Cost of sending about USD 200 to the Philippines (2014 estimates)  
From 
Country 
Operator Amount Transfer fee Total cost (with 
exchange rate 
margin) 
Percentage 
cost of sent 
amount 
Qatar Xpress Money USD 200 USD 4,12 USD 4,95 2,47% 
 Arabian 
Exchange 
Company 
USD 200 USD 6,32 USD 9,63 4,82% 
 Commercial 
Bank 
USD 200 USD 6,87 USD 14,78 7,39% 
 Western Union USD 200 USD 4,95 USD 16,15 8,01% 
United 
States 
Citibank USD 200 USD 0 USD 0 0% 
 Remitly USD 200 USD 4,99 USD 5 2,50% 
 Western Union  USD 200 USD 0 USD 5,24 2,62% 
 PNB 
(Philippines 
National Bank) 
USD 200 USD 11,14 USD 11,14 5,57% 
Australia Aussi Forex 
and Finance 
USD 158 USD 3,95 USD 4,66 2,95% 
 Expeed Global USD 158 USD 4,74 USD 5,09 3,22% 
 mHITs Remit USD 158 USD 5,49 USD 5,53 3,5% 
 Western Union USD 158 USD 3,95 USD 6,84 4,33% 
Canada Metro 
Remittance 
USD 165 USD 5,78 USD 5,76 3,49% 
 Reliable Peso 
Remit 
USD 165 USD 6,6 USD 6,59 3,99% 
 Western Union USD 165 USD 6,6 USD 7,61 4,61% 
 Royal Bank of 
Canada 
USD 165 USD 37 USD 41,9 25,39% 
Japan Forex Japan USD 141 USD 8,1 USD 7,79 5,52% 
 SBI remit USD 141 USD 6 USD 7,87 5,58% 
 PNB 
(Philippines 
National Bank) 
USD 141 USD 16 USD 19,37 13,74% 
 Japan Post 
Bank 
USD 141 USD 21 USD 22 15,60% 
Source: Remittance Prices Worldwide, The World Bank 
http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/en 
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Appendix 4: Individual country regression of remittances on GDP 
growth 
Table A4: STATA regression on individual countries effect of remittances on GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2346681   .4132596    -0.57   0.576    -1.089561    .6202245
      logrem     .5107523   .2089157     2.44   0.023     .0785773    .9429274
                                                                              
   loggrowth        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    12.4447751    24  .518532294           Root MSE      =  .65534
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1718
    Residual    9.87784996    23  .429471737           R-squared     =  0.2063
       Model     2.5669251     1   2.5669251           Prob > F      =  0.0226
                                                       F(  1,    23) =    5.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      25
. reg loggrowth logrem if Philippines==1
                                                                              
       _cons     1.609344   .1045964    15.39   0.000     1.394729    1.823958
      logrem    -.1692623   .2555388    -0.66   0.513    -.6935846      .35506
                                                                              
   loggrowth        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7.86524884    28  .280901744           Root MSE      =  .53539
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0205
    Residual    7.73948518    27  .286647599           R-squared     =  0.0160
       Model    .125763653     1  .125763653           Prob > F      =  0.5133
                                                       F(  1,    27) =    0.44
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29
. reg loggrowth logrem if Thailand==1
